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CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY LAWS 
AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COVRT; 
A TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE 
By Gerald F. Uelmen~ 
I. Introduction 
On December 27, 1976, in a unanimous opinion, the California 
Supreme Court declared that the California death penalty law 
enacted in 1973 was unconstitutional.. Rockwell v. Superior 
Court (1976) 18 C.3d 420. The Rockwell opinion surprised no one, 
since the U.S. Supreme Court had already held that "mandatory" 
death penalty laws were unconstitutipnal in Gregg v. Georgia 
" (1976) 428 U.S. 153, Woodson v. N. Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 
and Roberts v. Louisian~ (1976) 428 U.S. 325, decided earlier 
that year. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the "guided discretion" 
death penalty laws of Georgia, Florida and Texas, however, under 
Which the legislature defined specific "special circumstances" 
justifying imposition of the death penalty, and required the 
judge or jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in 
deciding whether death is the appropriate penalty. The 
California legislature responded by enacting a new death penalty 
law carefully modelled upon the laws upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The new death penalty law was authored by'then-Senator 
George Deukmejian. The bill was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown, 
*Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. As of 
July 1, 1986, Dean, School of Law, Santa Clara University. 
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of 
Michael Millman, Director, California Appellate Project 
who reviewed a draft, and Robin Gertler, Loyola Law Sch~OI 
'86, who compiled the appendix. 
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but re-enacted over his veto and became effective August 11, 
1977 .. Since the new law could not be applied "retroactively" to 
crimes committed before the date of its enactment, California 
"started over" on August 11, 1977 in terms of its efforts to 
implement the death penalty. 
Fifteen months later, in November of 1978, the 1977 death 
penalty law was repealed and replaced by a new death penalty law 
which broadly expanded the categories of cases in which the death 
penalty could be imposed. The initiative measure, popularly 
known as the "Briggs Initiative" for its author, Senator John 
Briggs, was passed by a 72% majority of the electorate. 
Both the 1977 death penalty law and the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative require three separate factual determinations before a 
judgment of death may be imposed. First, the defendant must be 
convicted of an offense which carries a possible death penalty. 
Such offenses include first degree murder, sabotage, treason, 
perjury procuring the execution of an innocent person, train 
wrecking, .. and deadly assault by one serving a life term. Second, 
if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, the finder 
of fact must conclude that one of the "special circumstances" 
defined by statute was true. If a "special circumstance" is 
found, a sentence of death or life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole must be imposed. otherwise, an ordinary 
sentence of 25 years to life, with eligibility for parole, will 
be imposGd. A conviction of sabotage, treason, perjury procuring 
2 
execution, train wrecking or assault by a lifo termer does not 
require additional "special circumstances," but virtually all 
death penalty cases in California have involved a charge of first 
degree murder. The third factual determination required is 
whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, in which case a penalty of death may be imposed. 
Each of these factual determinations must be upheld upon 
review by the California. supreme Court before a sentence of death 
can be carried out. As of March 1, 1986, a total of 54 death 
penalty judgments have been reviewed with finality on automatic 
appeal to the California Supreme Court. (The grant of a petition 
for rehearing prevents a decision becoming final, so no deci~ions 
in which a rehearing has been granted are included in this total. 
Decisions on writs have also been excluded). The purpose of this 
paper is to present an analysis of these decisions, and their 
impact upon the California death penalty law. 
Clearly, there is a widespread public perception that the 
decisions of the California Supreme Court have frustrated 
implementation of the death penalty in California. The record of 
the outcome of the 54 cases--5l reversals and 3 affirmances--is 
frequently cited to bolster that perception. The issue is much 
more complex than a simplistic box score can reveal, however. 
This paper will analyze the 54 cases from two perspectives. 
First, the cases will be analyzed in terms of the factual 
determinations being reviewed: the conviction of guilt, the 
finding of special circumstances, and the determination of 
penalty. Second, the cases will be analyzed in terms of which 
3 
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death penalty law waa utilized. Significant differences and 
patterns emerge at both levels ot this analysis. Hopefully, 
these differences and patterns, which are summarized in Table 1, 
will assist in identifying problems which are amenable to 
legislative solution. 
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TABLE 1 
§ymrn~n;:y Q '- OY!;~Qme Qf ~~11'Q[n1~ §u:g[~m~ CQY);:!; l2~gisions 
Reviewing Dea!;h Penalty Jydgments, 1979-198~. 
conviction Finding of Special Determination 
of Guilt circumstances of Penalty 
AFF. REV. AFF. REV. AFF. REV. 
1977 Death 16 11 12 4 3 9 
Penalty Law 
1978 Briggs 20 7 5 16 0 6 
Initiative 
TOTAL 36 18 17 20 3 15 
5 
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II. Historical and statistical OVerview 
A ten year perBpecti~e ori California death penalty laws is 
hardly panoramic. The death penalty goes back to California's 
beginning as a state, and a brief overview of its history will 
help put the past ten years in sharper focus. 
We will never know how many Californians were officially 
executed during the first forty-one years of California 
statehood. Executions were performed by County authorities, and 
no one ever bothered to count heads. This situation was remedied 
by the state legislature in 1891, with the enactment of the 
following provision: 
"A judgment of death must be executed within the walls 
of one of the stat~ Prisons designated by the Court by 
which judgment is rendered.. The Warden of the state 
Prison where the execution is to take place must be 
present at the execution and must invite the presence 
of a physician, the Attorney-General of the state, and 
at least twelve reputable citizens, to be selected by 
him; and he shall, at the request of the defendant, 
permit such ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two, 
as the defendant may name, and any persons, relatives 
or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the 
execution, together with such peace officers as he may 
think expedient, to witness the execution. But no 
other persons than those mentioned in this section can 
be present at the execution, nor can any person under 
age be allowed to witness the same." (Cal. stats., 
1891, ch. 191, § '9, p. 274; Now Cal. Pen. Code §§ 3603-
05) • 
\ 
After 1893, all hangings were performed by the state authorities, 
either at Folsom Prison or San Quentin. A total of 306 prisoners 
were executed by hanging during the forty-five year period ending 
in 1938, at an average rate of seven per year. Ninety-two were 
hanged at Folsom, while 214 met the end of the rope at San 
Quentin. Nearly all had been convicted of murder. Only three 
6 
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had been convicted of assault by one carving a life sentence, 
which became a capital offense in 1901, and three were hung for 
kidnapping, which was made a capital offense in 1933. San 
Quentin did not record the ethnic background of the executed, but 
the records of hangings at Folsom reveal that the vast majority 
of those executed were white. More death sentences came from Los 
Angeles than any other county in the state during this period. 
Los Angeles county supplied 55, while Sacramento County supplied 
34 and San Francisco county 33. Most of those who were hung in 
California sought appellate review of their convictions, but at 
least 74 went to the gallows with no review of their conviction 
by an appellate court. Automatic review of death penalty cases 
by the California Supreme Court was not instituted until April, 
1936. Lethal gas was adopted as the means of execution for 
California on August 27, 1937. Those who were sentenced prior to 
that date were still hung, so the last legal hanging in 
California was not performed at San Quentin until May 1, 1942, 
when l-taj or Raymond Lisenba, also known as "Rattlesnake James", 
was hung. Lisenba was convicted of murdering his wife by 
sticking her foot in a box full of diamond-back rattlesnakes. 
His challenge to the admissibility of a confession following 32 
hours of relay questioning was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Lisbena v. california (1941) 314 U.S. 219. 
The first person to die in California's gas chamber at San 
,Quentin was Albert Kessell, a Sacramento murderer, who was 
executed on December 2.' 1938. Since that day, 191 men and 4 
women have died in the San Quentin gas chamber. Executions 
7 
proceeded at an average rata of eight per year during the twenty-
year period ending in 195B. While appeals were automatic, the 
bet •. reen the pronouncement of sentence and actual average delay .. 
execution was less than two years. 
The ethnic distribution of the 195 persons who died in the 
California gas chamber differs little from the earlier data 
concerning hangings. Seventy-five percent were "white", 
including B% with spanish surnames. Twenty-three percent were 
Blacks. Los Angeles county again led the parade, with 45 
executions. Sacramento supplied 22, while only 15 were committed 
for execution from San Francisco. 
Under the California constitution adopted in lB79, clem~ncY 
power was curiously distributed among the executive, legislative 
and judicial branches. Article VII, section I provided: 
"The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieve, 
pardons, and commutations of sentence, after 
conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases 
of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such 
restrictions and limitations, as he may think proper, 
subject to such regulations as may be provided by law 
relative to the manner of applying for pardons. upon 
conviction for treason, the Governor shall have power 
to suspend the execution of the sentence until the case 
shall be reported to the Legislature at its next 
meeting when the Legislature shall either pardon 
direct the execution of the sentence, or grant at 
further reprieve~ The Governor shall cOIt\Il\unicate to 
the Legislature, at the beginning of every session 
every case of reprieve or pardon granted, stating the 
name of the convict, the crime of which he was 
convicted, the sentence, its date, the date of the 
pardon or reprieve, and the reasons for granting the 
same. Neither the Governor nor the Legislature shall 
have power,to grant pardons, or commutations of -
sentence, ~n any case where the convict has been twice 
convicted of felony, unless upon the written 
recommendation of a majority of the judges of the 
supreme Court." (Revised and Renumbered as Art. IV 
§ B of the California Constitution in 1966). ' 
! I 
-----"----------' -------- -_. 
While no one has ever been sentenced to death for treason in a 
California state court, there have been many instances of twice-
convicted felons sentenced to death. A study of 97 persons 
executed between 1938 and 1953 indicated that 51.6% had been in 
prison one or more times prior to the conviction for which they 
were executed. (Carter, "Capital PUnishment in California, 1938-
53," u. cal. School of criminology, 1953). There is no recorded 
example of the state supreme Court recommending clemency of a 
twice-convicted felon, however. An application by Warren K. 
Billings, who was convicted of the San Francisco Preparedness Day 
Parade bombing with Tom lfooney, was denied by the Supreme Court 
in 1930. In Re Billings (1930) 210 Cal. 669. 
The power of executive clemency was used sparingly by 
California governors. Earl Warren presided over 85 executions 
during his eleven years as California Governor. He granted 
clemency in only 8 cases. Governor Goodwin Knight exercised 
clemency in 6 cases, allowing the execution of 41 others during 
his five years in office. A dramatic change took place in 1959 , 
when Edmund G. "pat" Brown became Governor. Although he had 
served as District Attorney of San Francisco and California 
Attorney-General, Brown was philosophically opposed to the death 
penalty. The most difficult case confronting him was that of 
Caryl Chessman, who had been on San Quentin's death row since 
1948 after being convicted of kidnapping in Los Angeles County. 
Since Chessman was a twice-convicted felon, Brown could not 
commute Chessman's d8ath sentence without Supreme Court appr I ova . 
But he could grant a stay. In 1960, he stayed the execution for 
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sixty days and called upon the legislature to repeal the death 
penalty. The legislature refused, and Chessman was executed on 
May 2, 1960. Only 35 executions took place while Brown was 
governor, the last in January of 1963. He exercised the 
commutation power in 23 cases, or 40% of the cases that came 
before him. 
Since Brown left office in 1967, only one execution has 
occurred in California. Four months after Ronald Reagan's 
election as Governor, Aaron Mitchell, a black man convicted of a 
Sacramento murder, was executed on April 12, 1967. The 
moratorium on executions since that time has been judicially 
imposed. 
Actually, the judicial moratorium began in 1964, with the 
~3-\ 
case of People v. Morse (1964) 60 cal.2d~. The california 
Supreme Court held that it was error to instruct a jury deciding 
the death penalty that, if they do not sentence the defendant to 
death, he might be paroled after seven years. This necessitated 
new penalty trials for all prisoners on death row. Four years 
later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Witherspoon v. Illinoi§ 
(1968) 391 U.S. 510 also required the wholesale re-trial of the 
penalty proceedings of those awaiting execution because of the 
, , 
exclusion of jurors with general objections to the death penalty-
By December 31, 1971, California had 105 prisoners on death roW, 
awaiting the final ruling on the ultimate constitutional 
question: Does the death penalty itself violate the 
constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment? 
The answer came on February 18, 1972 in People v. Anderson, 6 
\ 
\ 
II 
\ 
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Cal.3d 628. writing for a majority of six (only Justice McComb 
dissented), Chief Justice Donald wright held: 
"capital punishment is both cruel and unusual as those 
terms are defined under Article I, section 6 of the 
California constitution, and that therefore, death may 
not be exacted as punishment for crime in this state." 
Governor Reagan was subsequently quoted as regretting the 
appointment of Chief Justice Wright as his "biggest mistake". 
Among the more notorious occupants of "death row" who escaped 
execution by virtue of the Anderson decision were Charles Manson 
leader of the cult which committed the grisly murders of Sharon 
Tate and her friends; Sirhan Sirhan, who assassinated Robert F. 
, 
Kennedy in 1968; and Gregory u. powell, convicted of the 
execution murder of a Los Angeles police officer in an onion 
field near Bakersfield. public outrage over the opinion was 
expressed in the quick enactment of a constitutional amendment 
declaring that the death penalty is neither cruel nor unusual 
punishment. Calif. const., Art. I, § 27. proposition 17 was 
enacted by a 67% majority in the election of November 7, 1972. 
Meanwhile, the united states supreme Court handed down nine 
separate opinions in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238 
on June 29, 1972. The opinions were widely interpreted as 
prohibiting discretion in the imposition of the death penalty. 
In 1973, the california legislature responded to the mandate of 
Proposition 17 and the generallY accepted interpretation of 
Furman by enacting a mandatory death penalty law, requiring that 
the death penalty be imposed in all cases of contract killings, 
murders of police officers or crime witnesses, multiple killings, 
11 
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and murders during commission of rape, robbery, burglary, 
kidnapping or child molestation. During the next three years, 
another fifty persons were sentenced to death in California under 
this law. 
In 1976, the united states Supreme Court held that a 
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its companion cases. California was 
among the twenty states that had enacted mandatory death penalty 
laws. The California Supreme Court declared the 1973 mandatory 
law unconstitutional in a unanimous opinion on December 7, 1976. 
Rockwell v. superior Court, 18 Cal.3d 420 (1976). 
The subsequent enactment of the 1977 death penalty law ~nd 
the 1978 Briggs Initiative has already been recounted. From 
August 11, 1977 through December 31, 1985, a total of 214 
judgments of death were entered in California courts. 
The geographical distribution of death penalty judgments is 
consistent with earlier experience. Nearly one-third came from 
Los Angeles county. San Bernardino County is in second place, 
followed by Orange County and Sacramento County. San Francisco 
ranks a distant seventh. The ethnic distribution of death 
judgments since 1978 reflects a higher proportion of minorities 
than any previous time in California history. Forty-five percent 
were Caucasian, 39% Black, 12% Hispanic and 4% Asian or Native 
American. 
The nUmber of judgments has declined dramatically since 
hitting a peak of 40 in 1981. In 1985, the Supreme Court 
reviewed more cases than death judgments were entered, thus 
12 
posting the first reduction in the backlog of undecided cases 
that had accumulated. The numbers of judgments and Supreme Court 
decisions for each year are compiled in Table 2. The "backlog" 
does not reflect four suicides on California's death row since 
1978. 
13 
Table 2 
California SUQreme Court Di,sQosition of Death J:udgm~n~s, J.27~-
l~ 
Death Suprema 
Year Judgments Court Decisions "Backlog" 
1978 7 0 7 
1979 20 2 25 
1980 24 6* 43 
1981 40 3 80 
1982 39 7 112 
1983 37 5 144 
1984 29 10 163 
1985 18 23** 158 
TOTALS 214 56 158 
* Includes one case ·transferred to Court of Appeal for 
disposition. 
** Includes one case disposed on Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
14 
The initial delays in catching up on the backlog are not 
unique to California. The same pattern is a national phenomenon. 
Table 3 shows the number of death penalty judgments entered 
throughout the united states for each year since 1975, the number 
of executions carried out, and the growth in the national death 
row population since 1980. The number on death row awaiting 
execution is substantially less than the total of death judgments 
reduced by executions because the death row population is reduced 
each year by suicides, other deaths, commutations, and court 
reversals. Despite these reductions, the national death row 
population has increased by approximately 180 during each of the 
three past years. 
15 
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Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TOTALS 
u. S. Execution 
Death 
Judgments, 
322 
249 
159 
209 
172 
200 
250 
284 
259 
280 
323' 
2707 
Table 3 
of Death Judgments, 1975-1985. 
Death Row Executions Population 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 718 1 924 2 1137 5 1289 21 1464 18 1642 
50 
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III. Th9 Conviction Qf Guilt 
Of the 54 death penalty judgments reviewed with finality by 
the California Supreme Court since 1979, the conviction of guilt 
of first degree murder has been affirmed in 36, or 67% of the 
cases. The rate of affirmance is actually higher for cases 
reviewed under the 1978 Briggs Initiative (20 out of 27, or 74%) 
than for cases reviewed under the 1977 death penalty law (16 out 
of 27, or 59%). A sUbstantial proportion of the affirmances are 
by a unanimous Court (32 out of 36, or 89%). 
This rate of affirmance might be compared to the overall 
rate of affirmance for other criminal appeals brought to the 
Supreme Court by defendants. That rate has varied in recent 
years from 69% in fiscal year 1"981-82 to 41% in 1983-84. Such a 
comparison might be misleading, however. Other criminal appeals 
are self-selected by the Court, so a low rate of affirmance can 
be anticipated. Ordinarily, the Court does not grant a hearing 
unless it sees a potential problem with the lower court ruling. 
All death penalty judgments are automatically reviewed by the 
Court, however. Thus, it might be more meaningful to compare the 
rate of affirmance to the affirmance rate for all criminal 
appeals heard by the Courts of Appeal. That rate is much higher. 
In fiscal year 1983-84, 76% of the criminal convictions reviewed 
by the Courts of Appeal were affirmed in full, while another 15% 
were affirmed with modifications. This affirmance rate of 91% is 
substantially higher than comparable rates for intermediate 
appellate courts in other states, such as Texas (83%), New Jersey 
17 
(84%), and Illinois (77~). The rate may vary significantly among 
various divisions of the Courts of Appeal, however. A 1984 study 
co-authored by this author disclosed that the affirmance rate for 
criminal appeals heard by the seven divisions of the Second 
District Court of Appeal varied from 73% to 97%. (Kanner & 
Uelmen, "Random Assignment, Random Justice," 6 Los Angeles 
Lawyer, No. 11, p. 10, Feb., 1984). A recent study of criminal 
appeals processed by the First District Court of Appeal concluded 
that the high rate of affirmance in intermediate criminal appeals 
is attributable to the harmless error rule and the sUbstantial 
evidence rule, perceived as "norms of affirmance" by appellate 
justices. (Davies, "Affirmed: A study of Criminal Appeals and 
Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal," 1982 Am. 
Bar Found. Res. J.543).· Clearly, these rules are not viewed as 
"norms of affirmance" in death penalty cases. Judges are much 
more likely to resolve doubts in favor of the accused in a case 
where the death penalty has been imposed. This is not a 
phenomenon unique to the California Supreme Court·. The same 
phenomenon has long been observed in the u.s. Supreme Court. 
(Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 1961). 
Thus, the California Supreme Court's rate of affirmance of 
the conviction of guilt in death penalty cases is higher than its 
rate of affirmance in non-death cases, but lower than the rate of 
affirmance of the California Courts of Appeal in non-death cases. 
How does it compare with the rate in death penalty cases reviewed 
by the Supreme Courts of other states? While data has not been 
compiled in many other states, figures are available for the 
18 
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period 1972-1982 in Florida. Florida'c 1972 doath penalty law 
was upheld by the u.s. Supreme Court in 1976 (PrQffitt VI 
Florida (1976) 428 u.s. 242), so the Flo~ida Supreme Court has 
reviewed more death penalty judgments in recent years than any 
other court. Of 145 cases reviewed up to 1982, a total of 70 
were reversed, but only 20 of these were remanded for new trials 
on the issue of guilt. The other 50 cases were reversals of the 
death penalty only. Thus, the comparable rate of affirmance of 
the conviction of guilt in death penalty cases for the Florida 
Supreme Court is 85%, substantially higher than the 67% posted by 
the California supreme Court. (Radelet & Vandiver, "The Florida 
Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals," 74 J. of Crim. Law & 
Criminology 913 (1983)). 
Of the 18 death penalty cases in which the California 
Supreme Court has reversed the conviction of guilt, by far the 
largest number of reversals, eight cases, were based on issues 
related to the role of defense counsel in capital cases. In 
three cases, the court concluded the defendant was deprived of 
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and 
state constitutions. (people v. Frierson (1979) 25 C.3d 142; 
People v. Mozingo, (1983) 34 C.3d 926; People v. Mroczko (1983) 
35 C.3d 86). All three decisions were unanimous. In the first 
two cases, the court found that the incompetency of retained 
counsel deprived the defendants of the effective assistance of 
counsel. In the third case, a conflict of interest in joint 
representation of twv defendants by the same contract public 
defender necessitated reversal. Another two cases resulted in 
19 
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reversal due to deprivation of the defendant'a rights to self 
representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. 
In People v. Joseph (1983) .34 C.3d 938, the Court held the trial 
cour~ erred by applying a higher standard of competency to waive 
counsel in capital cases than in non-capital cases. In People v. 
Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731, the Court held the trial court erred 
in concluding that it lacked discretion to appoint advisory 
counsel for a defendant who elected to represent himself. Both 
of these holdings were also unanimous. still another unanimous 
reversal was based on deprivation of the defendant's right to 
counsel of his choice, when the trial court refused a continuance 
to permit the defendant to select a replacement for an 
experienced trial lawyer who withdrew as co-counsel on the eve of 
trial. People v. Gzikowski (1982) .32 C.3d 580. 
The large number of reversals based on issues involving 
competency of counsel may be one symptom of a serious deficiency 
in the processing of Capital cases in California. It has been 
estimated that 15-20% of trial representation·and20% of 
appellate representation in California death penalty cases is 
"significantly substandard." Millman, "Financing the Right to 
Counsel in capital Cases," Proceedings of Conference on Financing 
. the Right to Counsel in California, 19 Loy. (L.A.) L. Rev. 383, 
385 (1985). Less than 2% of death row inmates are represented by 
retained counsel. Id. at 384. Providing adequate funding for 
the defense of capital cases is not just an issue of fairness, it 
is an issue of sound economics. Reversals necessitated by 
20 
incompetence of counsel require expensive retrials that may be 
avoidable. 
TWo more convictions were reversed because the requirements 
of California Penal Code § 1018 were not observed. (people v! 
Chadd (1981) 28 C.3d 739; People v. Massie (1985) 40 C.3d 620) . 
Section 1018 requires the consent of defense counsel to a plea of 
guilty entered in a capital cases. Both decisions were 5-2. The 
Chadd dissenters urged that § 1018 be declared unconstitutional. 
The Massie dissenters argued that the reluctant concurrence of 
defense counsel in a plea entered before Chadd was decided was 
sufficient to comply with § 1018. 
section 1018 may be inconsistent with the right of self 
representation under Faretta. If a defendant insists on entering 
a guilty plea over counsel's objection, People v. Joseph gives 
him the option of waiving counsel. But § 1018 now provides that 
"No plea of guilty • . . shall be received from a defendant who 
does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received 
without the consent of the defendant's counsel." Thus, the final 
authority to permit a plea of guilty is relegated to counsel, 
even in cases where the defendant is competent to waive counsel. 
This creates an anomaly the legislature may wish to address. 
The·second largest category of reversals of convictions of 
guilt, seven cases, were based on the erroneous admission or 
exclusion of evidence on the issue of guilt. Half of these cases 
involved the erroneous admission of out of court statements by 
the defendant. In people v. Hogan (1982) 31 C.3d 815, the 
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defendant's statemento wer~ found involuntary. In Peoplo V. 
Mattson (1984) 37 C.3d 85, the Court concluded the defendant's 
statements were elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. And 
in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 C.3d 504, the Court found that 
statements made by the defendant t~ a psychiatrist conducting a 
competency examination were erroneously admitted in violation of 
the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. Justice Mosk and Justice Richardson dissented in 
Hogan and Arcega, while Justices Kaus and Grodin dissented from 
Justice Mosk's majority opinion in Mattson. The reversals in 
Hogan and Arcega were required by U.S. Supreme Court precedents 
interpreting the federal constitution. Although Mattson relied 
directly on California law to exclude evidence which the federal 
constitution would not require be excluded, the result would not 
be different if Proposition Eight, enacted in June, 1982, were 
being applied. The "truth.in evidence" provision does not apply 
to exclusionary rules based on evidentiary privilege against 
self-incrimination. Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 C.3d 
802. Proposition Eight has no application to crimes committed 
before the date of its enactment. People v. Smith (1983) 34 C.3d 
251. 
Another three convictions were overturned because of 
erroneous admission of prior criminal conduct of the defendant. 
In People v. Alcala (1984) 36 C.3d 604, the defendant's 
convictions of three prior abductions of young girls were 
erroneously admitted to show the defendant's identity as the 
perpetrator of the charged abduction and murder. In People v. 
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H2lt (1984) 37 C.3d 436, one basiB for reversal waG that the 
defendant'o prior convictions of burglary and prison escape were 
erroneously admitted to impeach his testimony at trial. Both 
cases were decided 5-1, with Justice Mosk dissenting in both 
cases. In a third case, reversed f~r failure to consider 
appointment of advisory counsel for a defendant who elected to 
represent himself, the Court also concluded that evidence of 
other crimes by the defendant was erroneously admitted. People 
v. Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731. It would appear that the 
enactment of proposition Eight in June of 1982 would change one 
basis for the result in Holt, permitting use of all felonies 
involving "moral turpitude" to impeach the defendant's testiJTIony. 
See People v. Castro (1985) C.3d 301. 
The remaining reversals of the underlying conviction of 
guilt were based on a wide variety of grounds, including failure 
to conduct a competency hearing (people v. Stankewitz (Douglas) 
(1982) 32 C.3d 80), underrepresentation of 'minorities in the jury 
pool (People v. Harris (1984) 36 C.3d 36), denial of pre-trial 
discovery (people v. Memro (1985) 38 C.3d 658) and erroneous jury 
instructions (people v. Cro~ (1985) 41 C.3d 1). Most of these 
cases were decided by a closely divided court: Stankewitz and 
Harris were 4-2, Memro was 4-3, and Croy was 5-2. 
In addition to the eighteen reversals of the conviction of 
guilt on automatic appeals, the court set aside one conviction in 
a death penalty case 'on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
In th f In Re stankewitz (Laird) (1985) 40 C.3d 391 the 
e case 0 --- ~ - ' 
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court granted a new trial on the grounds of misconduct of n juror 
during deliberations. 
A review of the grounds for· the eighteen reversals of 
convictions of guilt in capital cases reveals some ·interesting 
patterns. First, 44% of the reversals "lere necessitated by 
errors relating to the assistance of counsel for the accused. 
These decisions are characterized by a remarkable rate of 
unanimity among the Justices. In Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
466 U.S. 668 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the. standard of 
competence required of counsel is no different for capital cases 
than for any other criminal case. The factual circumstances of 
the cases which the California Supreme Court reversed for 
deprivation of effective assistance of counsel would require 
reversal of any criminal conviction. It does.not appear that the 
court is applying a higher standard of competency for capital 
cases, although the greater complexity of such cases quite 
naturally imposes greater demands on defense counsel's 
performance. 
Second, 39% of the reversals were based at least in part on 
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence at trial. This 
figure might be compared to an analysis of the grounds for all 
reversals of appeals decided by the Courts. of Appeal. At the 
behest· of the Legislative Analyst, the Judicial Council examined 
the grounds. for all appeals resulting in reversals for a two 
month period in 1981. Of the 75 criminal cases included, the 
erroneous denial of suppression motions accounted for 9 
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reversalo , or 12t of the total. (1983 Annual Report, 
Council of Califorriia, p .. 7). It should also be noted that 
Proposition Eight would probably require affirmance of only one 
of the 7 cases reversed on evidentiary grounds if it applied. 
Finally, only one reversal of the conviction of guilt was 
based on erroneous instructions to the jury. This is not 
surprising, since the pattern jury instructions routinely 
utilized in criminal cases are rarely reversed. By contrast , 
however, all of the reversals of the finding of special 
circumstances and most of the penalty reversals under the 1978 
Briggs Initiative have been due to errors in the instructions to 
the jury. unquestionably, this is attributable to the ~nset~ling 
influence of the many changes wrought by the Briggs Initiative 
and the lack of authoritative opinions interpreting those 
changes. In this respect, there is a strong parallel to the 
results reported in the 1983 Annual Report of the Judicial 
Council, referred to above. That study revealed 41 reversals, or 
55% of the 75 criminal cases included, were due to sentencing 
errors. A significant increase in such reversals was attributed 
to the enactment of the determinate sentencing act in 1978. The 
report concluded: 
"As to criminal appeals, therefore, there,is some 
'd th t both increased appeals and 1ncreased 
eV1 ence a, c~de with the adoption of a new and 
error may co~n ... 
complex law." 
Id That phenomenon appears to be repeating itself in 
~., atp. 9. 
the outcorr.e of the Supreme court review of the finding of special 
circumstances and determination of penalty under the 1978 Briggs 
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Initiative, addreosed in the romaining sections ot thio paper. 
IV. The Finding of special Circumstances. 
Under both the 1977 law and the 1978 Briggs Initiative, a 
sentence of death or life without parole can be imposed for first 
degree murder only if the fact finder concludes that one or more 
of the "special circumstances" specified in Penal Code section 
190.2 is true. Recognizing that not all first degree murders 
merit the ultimate penalty of death, ,the "special circumstances" 
contribute to the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate of 
the U.s. Supreme Court that discretion be directed and limited to 
provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which 
it is not." Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.s. 238, 313; Gregg 
v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 189. The "special circumstance" 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. with a single 
exception (a prior conviction of murder), the fact finder decides 
the truth of the "special circumstance" at the same time that it 
determines the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the 
underlying murder charge. If a verdict of guilty is returned 
with a finding that one or more "sp~cial circumstances" are true, 
the jury (or judge, if jury is waived) then proceeds in a 
separate hearing to decide whether a punisl:lment of death or.life 
without parole should be imposed. 
When a death penalty judgment is reviewed on automatic 
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court ordinarily has no occasion 
to review the finding of "special circumstances" if the 
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underlying conviction itself is reversed. The caso is remanded 
for a new trial, at which both guilt of the underlying charge and 
the truth of "special circumstances" will again be determined. 
If the underlying conviction is affirmed, however, the Court must 
still review the finding of "special circumstances." If the 
finding of "special circumstances" is reversed, the case is 
usually remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of the 
truth of the "special circumstances." A remand may be precluded 
by the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy, however, if 
the finding of "special circumstances" is reversed due to 
insufficiency of the evidence. 
Of the 54 death penalty judgments reviewed on automatic 
appeal to the California Supreme Court since 1977, the Court has 
affirmed the conviction and proceeded to review the findings of 
"special circumstances" in 36 cases. (In one case reviewed under 
the 1978 Briggs Initiative, the court reviewed and reversed the 
finding of "special circumstances" after reversing the underlying 
conviction. people v. Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731). Of those 36 
cases, 19 (53%) have resulted in a reversal of the finding of 
"special circumstances." All but four of these reversals, 
however, were in cases tried under the 1978 Briggs Initiative. 
While the "special circumstances" provisions of the 1977 law 
emerged virtually unscathed from the process of jUdicial review, 
75% of the cases tried under the Briggs Initiative in which 
convictions were affirmed were reversed due to error in the 
finding of special circumstances. Most of these reversals were 
due to the same error: failure to instruct the jury of the need 
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~o find intent to kill where "felony-murder" special 
circumstances were utilized~ 
A. The 1977 Law 
The 1977 Law specified a total of eleven possible "special 
circumstances" which might be alleged to justify imposition of a 
sentence of death or life without parole for first degree murder. 
The death penalty "las imposed in a total of twenty-seven of the 
cases reviewed thus far under the 1977 law. In most of these 
cases, more than one "special circumstance" was found. Eighteen 
of the cases included findings that the murder was committed 
during the commission of another felony: Robbery (sixteen ca~es) ; 
Kidnapping (six cases); Rape (three cases); Burglary (four 
cases); and Lewd Act Upon a Child (one case). Thirteen cases 
included findings that the defendant was convicted of more than 
one murder. One case included a finding the murder involved 
infliction of torture, one included a finding that the murder was 
done for valuable consideration, one included a finding that the 
victim was a police officer in the line of duty, and four 
included a finding that the defendant had a prior murder 
conviction. 
In reviewing these twenty-seven cases on automatic appeal, 
the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of guilt in 
eleven cases. Out of the sixteen cases in which the conviction 
was affirmed the Court upheld the finding of "special 
circumstances" in all but four cases. The Court actually upheld 
findings of "special circumstances" involvi:ng eight of the eleven 
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categories listed under the 1977 law: 
(1) Murder for valuable consideration 
(Easley) 
(2) Murder during commission of robbery 
(Velasquez, Lanphear, Harris, Robertson, Fields, 
Phillips) 
(3) Murder during commisssion of kidnapping 
(Robertson, Frank) 
(4) Murder during commission of rape 
(Robertson) 
(5) Murder during commission of burglary 
(Jackson, Harris) 
(6) Murder involving infliction of torture 
(Robertson) 
(7) conviction of more than one murder 
(Jackson, Harris, Murtishaw, Haskett, Robertson, 
Easley) 
(8) Murder after a prior conviction of murder 
(Velasquez, Lanphear) 
Two of the four cases in which findings of "special 
circumstances" were reversed under the 1977 law involved 
procedural errors which were unrelated to the legal definition of 
special circumstances. In Peoplev. Teron (1979) 23 Ca1.3d 103, 
the Court simply held the 1977 death penalty law could not be 
retroactively applied to a murder committed prior to its 
enactment. While the underlying conviction of murder was 
affirmed, the finding of "special circumstances" was reversed. 
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In People y. FriGt"r+Qo (1985) 39 cal .. 3d a03, the Court reversed 
the finding of special circumstances because of defense counsel's 
refusal to present evidence that the defendant wanted to present. 
The same case had previously bean reversed on the conviction of 
guilt due to incompetence of counsel. 
The other two cases in which findings of "special 
circumstances" were reversed under the 1977 law involved 
allegations that the murders were committed "during the 
commission" of, in one case a robbery and kidnapping, (People v. 
Green (1980) 27 C.3d 1) and in the other, a rObbery and burglary, 
(People v. Thompson (1980) 27 C.3d 303). In both cases, the 
Court found the felonie's in question were incidental to the 
murder, rather than vice-versa. As the Court construed the 
requirement that the murder occur "during the commission" of an 
enumerated felony, 
"at the very least, therefore, the Legislature must 
have intended that each special circumstan~e provide a 
rational basis for distinguishing between those 
murderers who deserve to be considered for the death 
penalty and those who do not. The Legislature declared 
that such a distinction could be drawn, inter alia, 
when the defendant committed a 'willful, deliberate and 
premeditated' murder 'during the commission' of a 
robbery or other listed felony ••• The provision thus 
expressed a legislative belief that it was not 
unconstitutionally arbitrary to expose to the death 
penalty those ,defendants who killed in cold blood in 
order to advance an independent felonious purpose, 
e.g., who carried out an execution-style slaying of the 
victim of or witness to a holdup, a kidnapping, or a 
rape. The Legislature's goal is not achieved, however, 
when the defendant's intent is not to steal but to kill 
and the robbery is merely incidental to the murder--'a 
second thing to it,' as the jury foreman here said--
because its sole obj ec·t is to facilitate or conceal the 
primary crime." 
(Green, 27 Cal.3d at p. 61). Neither of· these cases found any 
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error in tho instructions to the jury. Rather, based on an 
insufficiency of the evidence, they concluded that the "special 
circumstances" alleged had not been proven. In numerous 
subsequent cases under the 1977 law, the Court has distinguished 
its holdings in Green and Thompson, upholding findings of . 
"special circumstances" which included a murder "during the 
commission" of robbery, kidnapping, rape and burglary. 
Thus, in stark contrast to the 1978 Briggs Initiative, the 
1977 death penalty law was remarkably successful in defining 
"special circumstances" which survived judicial scrutiny. The 
findings of "special circumstances" were sustained in 75% of the 
cases in which they were reviewed, and the Court was unanimocs in 
most of those holdings. By contrast, in cases arising under the 
1978 Briggs Initiative, the finding of "special circumstances" 
was struck down in 75% of the cases in which that finding was 
reviewed after affirmance of the conviction of guilt. 
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·S; The 1978 Briggs Initiatiye~ 
·~he 1978 death penalty law, adopted by initiative in 
'Nove~e~, 1978, substantially expa.nded the "special 
circuin~tancesn availab+e to permit a· sentence of death or life 
without parole. The new categories created included: 
1. Murder committed to prevent arrest or perfect an· escape 
from la't>lful custody; 
2. Murder of federal law enforcement officers, firemen, 
pros~cutors, judges or elected officials related to the 
performance of their duties; 
3. Murder which was "especially heinous, atrocious or 
cruel;" 
4. Murder committed by lying in wait; 
5. Murder committed because of the victim's race, color, 
religion or nationality; 
6. Murder committed by poison. 
The initiative measure also made significant modifications in the 
categories of "special circumstances el previously defined in the 
1977 law. Most significant were the changes in the "felony-
murder" categories. Under the 1977 law, it. was absolutely clear 
that an intent to kill on the part of the defendant was pre-
requisite to a finding that the murder was committed during the 
commission of an enumerated felony'. section 190.2(c) had 
required that: 
"The defendant was personally present during the 
commission of the act or acts causing death, and with 
intent to cause death physically aided or committed 
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such act or acts causing death .•. " 
Section 190.2(d) had further provided: 
"For the purposes of subdivision (c), the defendant 
shall be deemed to have physically aided in the act or 
acts causing death only if it is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that his conduct constitutes an 
assault or a battery upon the victim or if by word or 
conduct he orders, initiates or coerces the actual 
killing of the victim." 
Both of these provisions were eliminated by the Briggs 
Initiative, but what was substituted left somewhat ambiguous the 
question whether a defendant participating in a felony had to 
actually intend to cause the death of the victim. Section 
190.2(a) (17) now requires that: 
"The murder was committed while the defendant was 
engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of 
attempted commission, ,or the immediate flight after I 
committing or attempt~ng to commit [an enumerated 
felony] ." 
Section 190.2(b), however, imposes a broad requirement of intent 
on all "special circumstances" with the exception of that for 
prior conviction of murder: 
"Every person wh7ther or no~ the actuc:l killer found guilty of intent~~nallY a~d~n~, abett~ng, ,counseling, 
commanding, induc~ng~ sol~c~t~n~, ~equest~ng, or 
assisting any actor ~n the comm~ss~on of murder in the 
first degree shall suf~er d~ath or confine~ent in state 
prison for a term of l~fe,w~thout the poss~bility of 
parole, in any case in wh~ch one or more of the special 
circumstances enumerated ~n paragraph .•. (17) ... of 
subdivision (a) of this se~tion has been charged and 
specially found under Sect~on 190.4 to be true." 
The issc~ of intent raised by this ambiguity achieved 
constitutional stature in Enmund v. Florida (·1982) 458 U.S. 782 
in which the U.S. supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
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prohibition of crucl and unusual punichmont procludoo tho 
imposition of a death ponalty in thQ abaonco 'of proof that the 
defendant killed, attempted ~o kill, or intended or contemplated 
that life would be taken. Interestingly, the u.s. Supreme Court 
noted that "only e.ightjurisdictions authorize imposition of the 
death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which 
another robber takes life.'" Aside from Florida, the 
jurisdictions identified included California, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming. 
Many of these states responded to Enmund by incorporating a 
requirement that the jury be instructed to make a factual finding 
of intent to kill before a ,death penalty can be imposed. In 
Allen v. State (1984) 321 S.E.2d 710, 715 n. 3, the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that where the death penalty is sought in a 
felony-murder case, the jury must be given the option of three 
verdicts: guilty of malice murder, guilty of felony murder or 
not guilty. The Mississippi legislature amended that state's 
death penalty law to require Enmund findings. Miss.Code Ann. § 
99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1985). The South Carolina Supreme Court held 
that during the penalty phase of a capital case, 
"the trial judge should charge that the death penalty 
can not be imposed on an individual who aids arid abets 
in a a crime in the course of which a murder is 
committed by others, but who di~ not himself kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or 
that lethal force be used." 
State v. Peterson (1985) 335 S.E.2d 800. Recently, the u.S. 
Supreme Court held in a 5-4 ruling, that the Enmund findings can 
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be made by an appellate court, a trial judge or a jury, and 
special instructions for a factual determination by the jury are 
not constitutionally required. Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 
______ u.s. , 38 Cr. L. 3093. 
The California Supreme Court addressed this problem for the 
first time in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 C.3d 131. 
Carlos was not a review of a death penalty judgment, but a 
pretrial writ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented at a preliminary hearing. Significantly, the issue was 
resolved as a question of statutory construction, rather than a 
constitutional question. The Court resolved the ambiguity by 
construing Section 190.2(b) to require a finding of intent tc 
kill before a defendant is subject to a felony murder special 
circumstance finding under Section 190.2(a) (17). Strong support 
for this interpretation was found in the ballot arguments which 
accompanied the Briggs Initiative. Voters were given emphatic 
assurances that one who merely aids another in committing a 
murder without intent to kill was not subject to the death 
penalty because section 190.2(b) "says that the person must have 
INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to be subject 
to the death penalty under this initiative." 
Eight months later, in Peoplev. Garcia (1984) 36 C.3d 539, 
the Court declared that Carlos would apply retroactively to all 
cases not yet final, and that, with limited exceptions to be 
noted, Carlos error is reversible per se, with no additional 
showing of prejudice required. The per se rule was found to be 
constitutionally required, because a failure to instruct the jury 
35 
that intent to kill muctbo found deprivao tho dcf0ndant of his 
constitutional right that"u jury be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The impact of tho U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in 
Cabana v. Bullock upon the ~ holding is yet to be 
determined, but it does not appear to erode the constitutional 
underpinnings of Garcia. Cabana held that "the Eighth Amendment 
simply imposes a requirement that the Enmund findings be made 
before a defendant can be executed. The findings need not be 
made in the same manner as underlying elements" of the crime, so a 
post hoc determination of an appellate court is adequate. 
Garcia, however, was based on the fact that Carlos had 
interpreted the statutory" requirements for a finding of special 
circumstances in felony murder cases to include a finding of 
intent to kill, thus creating a state-law entitlement to jury 
findings. The critical significance of the difference was noted 
by Justice White in his majority opinion in Cabana v. Bullock, 38 
Cr.L. at 3096, n.4, responding to Justice Blackmun's dissenting 
reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343: 
In Hicks, we held only that where state law creates for 
the defendant a liberty interest in having the jury 
make particular findings, the Due Process Clause 
implies that appellate findings do not suffice to 
protect that entitlement. Unlike the defendant in 
Hicks, Bullock had no state-law entitlement at the time 
of his trial to have the jury (or indeed, anyone at 
all) make the Enmund findings. Of course, federal law 
as later established by Enmund, does entitle Bullock to 
a determination whether he killed, attempted to kill, 
intended to kill or intended that lethal force be used; 
but for the reasons explained in the text, the federal-
law entitlement, unlike the state-law entitlement 
involved in Hicks, does not specify who must make the 
findings. 
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The Carlos/Garcia rulings havQ had groator impact on doath 
penalty adjudication in California than any other decisions of 
the California Supreme Court. Of the 20 cases in which the 
conviction of guilt was upheld and the finding of· special 
circumstances reviewed, 15 (75%) have resulted in reversal of the 
finding of special circumstances, and every one of these 
reversals has been based at least in part on the Carlos/Garcia 
rulings. 
The felony-murder special circumstances are frequently 
utilized in death penalty cases under the Briggs Initiative. Of 
the 27 cases tried under the Briggs Initiative which have been 
reviewed thus far, all but two included an allegation of at least 
one felony-murder "special circumstance": 21 murder during 
commission of a robbery; 3 murder during commission of a 
kidnapping; 3 murder during commission of a burglary; and 2 
murder duri.ng commission of a rape. The two cases in which 
felony-murder special circumstances were not alleged both 
resulted in affirmance of the finding of special circumstances. 
In People v. Deere (l985) 41 C.3d 353, findings of the special 
circumstance of multiple murder were affirmed, and in People v. 
Davenport (1985) 41 C.3d 247, a finding of the special 
circumstance of torture-murder was affirmed. 
only three cases in which felony-murder special 
circumstances were alleged under the 1978 Briggs Initiative 
resultec in affirmance of the finding of special circumstances. 
All came within exceptions to the Carlos/Garcia rulings. 
In People v. Brown (1985) 40 C.3d 512, the jury made a 
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special finding that tho: DlurdGr waa premeditated, thuD precluding 
any attack on tho finding of a rape-murder "special circumstance" 
under CarlQs/Gsafc:l!!. In P09ple v. tLQntiel (1985) 39 C.3d 910, 
the jury mado a finding the murder waG intentional in the course 
of finding another special circumstance was true: that the 
murder "was intentional and carried out for financial gain." 
Even though the financial gain "special circumstance" was set 
aside, the court held the intent finding could be utilized to 
sustain the felony-murder "special circumstance." In People v. 
Walker (1985) 41 C.3d 116, the Court found two exceptions to 
Carlos/Garcia applicable.' First, the issue of intent was 
necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant other under 
instructions. The defendant was charged with assault with intent 
to kill.two other victims sh~t at the same time as the murder 
victim, and the court found it '''inconceivable that a jury would 
find that a defendant intended to kill only the victims who 
survived, .and not the one who died." Second, an exception 
applies "",here the parties recognized that intent to kill was in 
issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and 
. . • the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a 
matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of 
consideration." The court assumed that all evidence available on 
intent was presented because it was an explicit element in issue, 
but suggested that the defendant could pursue a writ of habeas 
corpus if he "can demonstrate that this assumption is 
inaccurate." 
The Attorney General has predicted that Carlos/Garcia will 
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require reversal of the finding of special circumstances in 
dozens more of the still pending cases. Walker offers little 
prospect of altering the accuracy of that prediction. As the 
court noted in Walker. 
"We emphasize that Carlos error is ordinarily 
reversible per se, and that the tack we take here -
affirming the finding of special circumstances subject 
to possible review on petition for habeas corpus -
arises from the particular facts before us in this 
case." 
41 Cal.3d at 138, n. 6. 
While most reversals of "special circumstances" findings 
pursuant to the Carlos/Garcia rule have been in cases where 
felony-murder "special circumstances" were alleged pursuant to 
Section 190.2(a) (17), the Carlos/Garcia rule raises troublesome 
issues with respect to other definitions of "special 
circumstances" as well. 
First, the "intent" requirement of section 190.2(b) 
specifically includes all of the 19 enumerated "special 
circumstances" definitions except (a) (2), prior conviction of 
murder. This creates an anomaly, because some of the enumerated 
definitions include a specific requirement of intent, while 
others do not. The multiple-murder special circumstance of 
(a) (3) I for example, simply requires that the defendant "has in 
this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder 
in the first or second degree." In People v. Turner (1984) 37 
C.3d 302, the Supreme Cou:t.'t reversed a "special circumstance" 
finding of multiple murder as well as two felony-murder "special 
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circumctanc~n findinqB p holding that CarlQm intorprotod Scction 
190.2(b) to apply to tho actual killor &0 well GO to an 
accomplic0, and by ita terms it applies to ths multiplo-murder 
"special circumstance" as t<lell as the felony-murder "special 
circumstance". Thus, the intent instruction roquired by Carlos 
must be given under all of the "special circumstances" enumerated 
in section 190.2(a) except .(a) (2). 
Second, even section 190.2(a) (2) may raise a problem if it 
is applied to an accomplice who is not the actual killer and has 
no intent to kill. Since 190~2(b) el,cludes (a) (2) from its 
enumeration, the· ruling in Carlos has no direct application. 
While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this problem, one 
division of the Second District· Court of Appeal, in a non-death 
penalty case, held that (a) (2) does not require an intent to 
kill, but is. limited to the actual killer and does not apply to 
accomplices at all. The Court reasoned: 
"If subdivision (b) 't'/ere made applicable to subdivision 
(a) (2) then a person previously convicted of murder 
would be subject to the death penalty or life without 
possibility of parole for aiding and abetting when the 
actual killer might not be subject to that punishment • 
. It is our opinion that in order to avoid that result 
SUbdivision (a) (2) was designed as a special 
circumstance to apply only to the actual killer. It is 
our further opinion that subdivision (b) cannot be 
interpreted as engrafting on subdivimion (a) (2) a 
requirement of intent to kill or as limiting in any way 
that type of first degree murder required for its 
application." 
People v. Rivera (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 1984. Another division 
of the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that section 
(a) (2) can be applied to accomplices, but a requirement of intnet 
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must be "road in" despito section (b) in ordor to comply with 
Carlos. People V, Malone (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 31. The 
California Supreme Court granted a hearing in the Rivera case on 
September 12, 1985, to resolve this dispute, and the case is 
currently pending before the Supreme Court. 
Apart from the ambiguity as to Clintent to kill," many other 
definitions of "special circumstances" under the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative have created additional problems of interpretation for 
the courts. 
The inclusion of arson in the felony-murder "special 
circumstance" of Section 190.2(a) (17) (viii) has created confusion 
because it specifies "Arson in violation of section 447." Tile 
drafters apparently never looked up section 447 of the Penal 
Code. If they had, they would have discovered it was repealed in 
1929. In People v. Oliver (1985) 168 Cal. App. 3d 920, the 
Second District Court of Appeal upheld a conviction and sentence 
of life without parole based on the arson "special circumstance," 
since the defendant was concurrently convicted of a violation of 
Penal Code § 451, which restates the elements of arson in the 
same language as prior § 447. The Court cautioned, however, 
"In rejecting these claims on the facts before us, we 
do not imply they would under all circumstances be 
unmeritorious." 
Id. at 926. Additional confusion was created by the reference to 
kidnapping in Section 190.2(a) (17) (ii), because it specifies 
"Kidnapping in violation .of Sections 207 and 209." The 1977 
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death penalty law includod'HKidnapping in violation of Section 
207 Qk 209." Penal Code Section 207 defineo simple kidnapping, 
while Section 209 defines aggravated kidnapping. In People v. 
Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731, the Court declared that the use of 
the word "and" instead of "or" was a careless drafting error, and 
upheld an instruction that permitted a special circumstance 
finding if the defendant was convicted of kidnapping under either 
section 207 or 209. 
The "special circumstance" defined in Section 190.2(a) (14), 
that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, 
manifesting exceptional depravity," was declared 
unconstitutionally vague by a 5-1 vote of the California Supreme 
Court in People v. Superior Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797. 
Engert was clearly premised on state constitutional grounds, as 
well as federal grounds. Similar provisions in other states have 
met with mixed success. The Supreme Courts of Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Idaho and Wyoming have rejected the reasoning of 
Engert, while that of Delaware has agreed. The states which have 
accepted a similarly worded "special circumstance" have been 
plagued with many reversals of "special circumstance" findings 
where this special circumstance is utilized, however. In, 
Florida, for example, no fewer than 25 cases have reversed a 
finding that a murder was "heinous, atrocious or cruel" or "cold 
and calculated" because of inSUfficiency of evi~ence. 
In striking down the "special circumstance" for "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" murders in Engert, the Court noted 
the possible overlap with the "special circumstance" defined in 
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"" e infliction Section n 190.2(a} (lS), where tho murder "involv""d th 
of torture," further defined as tithe infliction of extreme pain 
no matter how long its duration.
tI In people v. Davenport (1985) 
41 C.3d 247, the court affirmed a finding of 
"special 
circumstances" based on a torture allegation 
under the 1978 
Briggs Initiative. The 1977 death penalty law also included a 
torture "special circumstance," which explicitly required an 
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. The Briggs 
Initiative omitted any reference to intent, focusing on the 
victim's experience of pain. The Court in Davenport found this 
focus ambiguous, because the victim's experience would be 
difficult to prove, and to distinguish murders on such a bas~s 
would raise a significant constitutional issue of equal 
protection of the law. Thus, it incorporated prior judicial 
construction of the term "torture" to require an intent to 
torture the victim. since the trial court had instructed the 
jury that both an intent to kill and the intentional infliction 
of extreme physical pain must be proven to establish the torture 
"special circumstance," the finding was upheld by the Court. 
Two more "special circumstance" definitions under the 1978 
Briggs Initiative were construed in people v. Bigelow (1984) 37 
C.3d 731. First, a finding that the murder was carried out for 
financial gain was reversed because the trial court construed it 
too broadly. Noting that the special circumstance defined in 
Section 1.90.2 (a) (1) "replaced the precise language of the 1977 
act with vague and broad generalities," the Court adopted a 
limiting construction requiring that the victim's death be an 
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essential pre-requicito to th~ financial gain cought by the 
defendant. A similar interpretation of analogous language has 
been adopted by the courts of Alabama, Florida and Nebraska, but 
rejected by Mississippi and North Carolina. Second, a finding 
that the murder was committed tlfor the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect 
an escape from lawful custody," \>las also reversed because of the 
broad interpretation given by the trial court. The Court held 
that the special circumstance of avoiding arrest must be limited 
to cases in which arrest is imminent, and the special 
circumstance of perfecting escape must be limited to situations 
before the defendant has departed the confines of a prison 
facili ty and reached a place of·. temporary safety outside the 
confines of the prison. In construing both the financial gain 
and avoiding arrest/perfecting escape "special circumstances," 
the Court was concerned with the SUbstantial overlap with felony-
murder "special circumstances" which would result if these 
provisions were broadly construed: 
"we believe the court should construe special 
circumstance provisions to minimize those cases in 
which multiple circumstances will apply to the same 
conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple 
findings on special circumstances will prejudice the 
defendant ... 
Id. at 751. 
The final "special circumstance" which created a problem of 
construction under the Briggs Initiative was section 
190.2(a) (10), where the murder was committed to prevent the 
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victim from testifying in a criminal proceeding. In People y. 
Weidert (1985) 39 C.3d 836, the Court held this provision could 
not be applied to a defendant who killed the victim to prevent 
his testimony in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The Court 
relied upon the long-standing distinction between criminal and 
juvenile proceedings embodied in Welfare and Institutions Code § 
203: 
"An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the 
juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction for any 
purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court 
be deemed a criminal proceeding." 
Apparently, the drafters of the initiative were oblivious to the 
impact of this crucial ~rovision. 
To summarize the implementation of the "special 
circumstances" provisions of the 1978 Briggs Initiative, nearly 
every clause has created a serious problem of construction, 
either because the element of intent was not carefully defined, 
or because careless drafting errors created inconsistencies or 
ambiguities. As a result, the finding of special circumstances 
has been struck down in 75% of the cases in which it was reviewed 
after affirmance of the conviction of guilt. This is in sharp 
contrast to the 1977 law, under which 75% of such findings 
reviewed were upheld. The Supreme Court can hardly be faulted 
for this dismal record. In case after case, the Court has 
strained to give the "special circumstance" provisions a 
reasonable construction, to avoid declaring them 
unconstitutional. While this has necessitated numerous reversals 
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in cases where trial judgos could not anticipato how these 
provisions would be construed, the Court has now provided 
authpritative interpretations of nearly all of the "special 
circumstance" provisions that.are most frequently utilized. 
Thus, it can be anticipated that the affirmance rate for cases 
being tried today will increase substantially. Ironically, every 
case prosecuted under the Briggs Initiative reviewed so far could 
have been prosecuted as a capital case under the 1977 law. 
Unquestionably, the rate of affirmance of the findings of special 
circumstances would have been substantially higher. Thus, the 
Briggs Initiative added little to the law except confusion, and 
the price being paid for that addition is numerous reversals that 
would have been unnecessary if the 1977 law had remained 
unchanged. 
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V. The Determination of Penalty 
Under both the 1977 death penalty law and the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative after a defendant has been convicted and an , 
allegation of "special circumstances" found true, a separate 
hearing for the determination of penalty is mandated. That 
hearing ordinarily takes place before the same jury which 
convicted the defendant and found the "special circumstances" to 
be true. Even if the defendant waived a jury trial on the issue 
of guilt or special circumstances, or pled guilty, he is entitled 
to a jury determination of the penalty. The jury must choose 
between the penalties of death or life imprisonment without 
pOssibility of parole, and must agree unanimously as to that 
choice. Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is 
admitted, and the jury is instructed as to the exercise of their 
discretion. In reviewing the determination of penalty, the 
California supreme court may be called upon to decide a variety 
of issues, including the procedure by which the jury was 
selected, the admissibility of evidence, the competence of 
counsel, and the propriety of instructions to the jury. Since 
the restoration of the death penalty in California on August 11, 
1977, the Supreme Court has reviewed the penalty determination in 
seventeen cases in which a conviction of guilt and finding of 
special circumstances were affirmed. (In one additional case, 
People v. Ramos (1982 30 C.3d 353, the Court reviewed the 
determination of penalty even though the finding of special 
circumstances was reversed). Of these seventeen cases, the 
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determination of penalty was .rcversed in fourteen. All three of 
the affirmances were in cases under the 1977 death penalty law. 
Thus far, the determination of penalty under the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative has been reversed in every case in which it was 
reviewed. 
A. The 1977 Law. 
The determination of penalty has been revie~.,ed in a total of 
twelve cases under the 1977 death penalty law. In three cases, 
the imposition of the death penalty was affirmed. People v. 
Jackson (1~80) 28 C.3d 264; People v. Harris. (1981) 28 C.3d 935; 
People v. Fields (1983) 35 C.3d 329. All three cases were 
affirmed by a closely divided Court (4-3 in Jackson, 4-2 in 
Harris and Fields), and all thiee cases are still pending in the 
courts. Harris is seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the federal 
courts, while Jackson and Fields have petitions for writs pending 
in California courts. 
Of the nine cases in which the determination of penalty was 
reversed, five were for procedural 'errors and four were because 
of instructions given to the jury. 
The pro~edural errors included two cases reversed for 
"Witherspoon" error. People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 C.3d 425; 
People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 C.3d 814. In Witherspoon v • 
• 
Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, the U.S. Supreme Court established 
standards for the exclusion of jurors who have conscientious 
scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty. While such 
scruples were expressed by jurors in both Velasquez and Lanphear, 
the jurors never indicated they would automatically vote against 
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the death penalty under all circUMstances. Ralying upon specific 
language in footnote 21 of Witherspoon, the California Supreme 
Court held it was error to excuse the jurors in both cases. 
Footnote 21 declared that jurors could be excluded if they "made 
unmistakably clear ••• that they would automatically vote against 
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any 
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before 
them •••• " The u.s. Supreme Court again addressed the standard 
for exclusion of jurors with death penalty scruples in Adams v. 
Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, holding that a juror could be excluded 
if his views about capital punishment "would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath." On petitions for 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated both Velasquez and 
Lanphear, and remanded them for "further consideration in light 
of Adams v. Texas." On remand, the California Supreme Court 
again reversed, relying squarely on footnote 21 of Witherspoon, 
declaring that Adams v. Texas "does not alter this conclusion." 
People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 C.3d 461; People v. Lanphear (1980) 
28 C.3d 463. In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court finally clarified 
the confusion between the Witherspoon and Adams standards by 
explicitly rejecting footnote 21 of Witherspoon as dicta. In 
Wainwright v. witt (1985) ____ U.S. ___ , 36 Cr.L. 3116, the Court 
concluded: 
"We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our 
decision in witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-
quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard •... We 
note that, in addition to dispensing with 
Witherspoon's reference to 'automatic' decision making, 
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thia standard liktawioo does not requiro that a juror's 
biao be proved with unmistnkable clarity." 
rg. at 3119. It appears unlikely that the new atandard approved 
in Wainwright v. ~ would require reversal of cases like 
Velasquez or Lanphear if they were to recur today. That is not 
to suggest that Velasquez·or Lanphear were wrongly decided, 
however. As Justice Rehnquist conceded in his majority opinion 
in wainwright v. witt, the confused state of the case law lef.t 
trial courts a difficult tasle, "obviously made more difficult by 
the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs markedly from 
the language of footnote 21 •.•. given witherspoon's facts a court 
applying the general principles of Adams could have arrived at 
the 'automatically' language of Witherspoon's footnote 21." Id. 
Another three reversals of penalty determinations were based 
on the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence. In People v. 
Murtishaw (1981) 29 C.3d 733, the evidence was a prediction by a 
psychopharmacologist who briefly examined the defendant that he 
would continue to be violent in a prison setting. The Court 
found such predictions too unreliable to be admissible as 
evidence in a death penalty determination. The admission of 
similar predictions was held not to violate the due process 
clause of the federal constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 U.S. 880. It might be suggested 
that enactment of proposition Eight in June of 1982 would require 
california courts to now follow Barefoot v. Estelle and admit 
such evidence. Such a course would be dangerous. Murtishaw is 
premised on the conclusion that the prejudicial impact of the 
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evidence outweighed its probative value. Such determinations 
pursuant to Evidence Code I 352 are unaffected by Proposition 
Eight. In People v. Frank (1985) 38 C.3d 711, the erroneously 
admitted evidence was notebooks which were illegally seized from 
the defendant. Although the Court concluded their admission was 
harmless error in the guilt phase, their "dramatically greater" 
role in the penalty phase required reversal of the penalty 
determination. And in People v. Phillips (l985) 41 C.3d 29, the 
Court held it ~.,as error to admit evidence of defendant's 
discussion with another of proposed criminal activity, since 
evidence of other "criminal activity" in the penalty phase must 
relate to actual, completed crime. 
The Phillips Court also found error in the penalty phase 
instructions, in failing to instruct the jury that evidence of 
other crimes relied upon as an aggravating circumstance must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In this respect, the Court 
followed its prior ruling in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 C.3d 
21, which held that this long-standing California rule had not 
been overruled sub silentio by the 1977 death penalty law. 
Another reversal for erroneous jury instructions came in 
People v. Haskett (1982) 30 C.3d 841, where the trial judge 
instructed the jury that the Governor could commute a sentence of 
life without possibility of parole. Such an instruction was 
mandated by the 1978 Briggs Initiative, and will be discussed in 
greater detail in the treatment of cases decided under the 1978 
Initiative. Since Haskett arose under the 1977 law, however, the 
instruction was not mandated in that case. In holding that it 
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was error to giv~ the instruction, the Court placed principal. 
reliance on its precedent in People v. MQrse (1964) 60 C.2d 631. 
~/O more reversals of penalty determinations under the 1977 
law were attributable to errors in instructions to the jury. One 
of the standard "boiler place" instructions routinely given in 
criminal cases is CAIJIC No. 1.00: 
"As jurors, you must not be influenced by pity for a 
defendant or by prejudice against him. You must not be 
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, 
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." 
In People v. Easley (1983) 34 C.3d 858, the Court held that it 
was error to give this instruction at the penalty phase of a 
capital case, even though it might be appropriate at the guilt 
phase. Actually, Easl3Y followed an earlier precedent of the 
Court dating back to 1970. People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 C.3d 
609. The Court concluded the instruction could have the effect 
of telling the jury not to give weight to mitigating evidence 
presented by the defendant. Easley was followed to require 
another reversal of the penalty determination in People v. 
Lanphear (1984) 36 C.3d 163, previously reversed because of 
Witherspoon error. The courts of other states have generally 
rejected the Easley ruling, permitting "no sympathy" 
instructions. The Supreme Courts of Louisiana, Nevada, Oklahoma 
and South Carolina have upheld such instructions, While the 
Georgia Supreme Court has agreed with Easley. 
ThUS, none of the nine reversals of penalty determinations 
under the 1977 death penalty la~l were due to flaws in the 
drafting of the legislation. At least six of the reversals can 
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be diractly traced to clGar precedents docided long before the 
1977 law was enacted. While at least one of those precedents 
(Witherspoon) has since been repudiated by the u.s. Supreme 
Court, only the U.S. supreme Court is in a position to repudiate 
its own precedents. Until they are repudiated, the California 
Supreme Court is required to follow them. 
B. The 1978 Briggs Initiative 
The California supreme Court has reviewed the penalty 
determination in five cases tried under the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative after affirming the conviction of guilt and finding of 
special circumstances. Four of the five reversals were for 
instructional errors, and three of those four were instructional 
errors directly attributable to the language of the initiative. 
The 1978 Briggs Initiative made two fundamental changes in 
the penalty determination procedure mandated by the 1977 death 
penalty law. The first change was to require an instruction be 
given to the jury that a sentence of life without possibility of 
parole can be commuted or modified: 
"The trier fact shall b7 instructed that a ~entence of 
confinement to state pr~son fo~ a term of l~fe without 
the possibility of parole may 7n.future after sentence 
is imposed be commuted or mod~f~ed to a sentence that 
includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of 
the state of california." 
Penal Code §190. 3 • This was apparently intended as a direct 
1964 ruling of the California Supreme Court repudiation of the in 
People v. l-iorse (1964) 60 C.2d 631, which held that the 
possibility of parole is essentially irrelevant to the issues the 
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jury is called upon to decide, and that inGtructin~ the jury as 
to the commutation power of the governor over lifo sentences is a 
"half-truth, to since that pOliler extends to sentences of death as 
well. This provision of the Briggs Initiative was unique. None 
of the other 38 states with death penalty laws mandate such an 
instruction," and the Courts of 25 of those states have ruled that 
the jury should not consider the possibility of pardon, parole or 
cummutation. In the fifteen years since the" death penalty was 
struck down in Furman, only one state supreme court (Indiana) has 
approved of an instruction allowing the jury to consider the 
possibility of parole or commutation in deciding whether to 
impose the death penalty. 
In People v. Ramos (1982) 30 C.3d 553, the California 
Supreme court held in a 6-1 decision authored by Justice 
Tobriner, that the commutation instruction mandated by the Briggs 
Initiative violated the due process rights guaranteed by the 
Fifth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, 
by encouraging the jury to consider an irrelevant and confusing 
factor and biasing the outcome in favor of the death penalty. 
This ruling was reversed "by the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
held in a 5-4 decision that the instruction did not violate the 
federal constitution. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992. 
On remand, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the instruction under the State 
constitution. Actually, the intervening decisions in Carlos and 
Garcia then required reversal of the special circumstances 
finding in Ramos, but the Court addressed the penalty phase issue 
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"for guidance both at retrial and in other casef21." Although 
three of the Justices who decided Ramos I had been replaced, the 
vote was again 6-1 to strike down the Briggs Instruction, this 
time as a violation of the due process guarantee of the 
California constitution. People v. Ramos (1984) 37 C.3d 136. 
Ramos was followed to require the reversal of another death 
penalty determination in People v. Montiel (1985) 39 C.3d 910. 
An alternative holding in Montiel was that reversal of the 
penalty determination was required because the trial court gave 
the same "no sympathy" instruction condemned in People v. Easley 
(1983) 34 C.3d 858, discussed above under 1977 death penalty law 
cases. The "no-sympathy" instruction led to reversal of still 
another case tried under the 1978 Briggs Initiative in People v. 
Brown (1985) 40 C.3d 512. 
The Brown Court also addressed the second fundamental change 
which the Briggs Initiative made in the penalty determination 
procedure established by the 1977 law. The 1977 law defined a 
number of aggravating and mitigating factors which might be 
relevant, and then provided that the jury "consider, take into 
account and be guided by" those factors in making the ultimate 
determination of the appropriate penalty. The 1978 Briggs 
Initiative went a step beyond, concluding that the trier of fact 
" •.• shall impose a sentence o~ dea~h if the trier of 
fact concludes that the aggravat~ng c~rcumstances 
outweigh the mitigating ci:c~mst~nces: If the trier of 
fact determines that the ~7t~gat~ng c~rcumstances 
outweigh the aggravating c~rcumstanc7s the t:ier of 
fact shall impose a sentence of conf~nement ~n state 
prison for a te~~ of life without the possibility of 
parole." 
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Penal Coda § 190.3 While this provioion io susceptiblo to an 
interpretation that the death penalty is mandatory if a 
mechanical "balancing" of aggravating and mitigating factors is 
heavier on the aggravation side, the n.rown court rejected such an 
inteipretation and upheld th~ statute against constitutional 
attack. The Court noted that "each juror is free to assign 
whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each 
and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider," 
rather than mechanically counting the factors. The word "shall," 
the Court concluded,does not require any juror to vote for death 
unless he considers it the appropriate penalty under all the 
circumstances. Nonetheless, the Court noted the potential for 
confusion if the statute were simply read to the jury with no 
further explanation. In future trials, the Court ruled, the 
scope of its discretion must be explained to juries. In a 
modification of its opinion announced January 30, 1986, the Court 
indicated that a recently drafted modification of CALJIC 
Instruction No. 8.84.2 would conform to its requirements. 41 
C.3d 43ge. In cases already tried where no such instruction was 
given, the Court indicated it would examine, on a case by case 
basis, whether "the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's 
prejudice," Id. at 545, n.17. 
The potential for confusion was underscored by a Professor 
of Linguistics at U. C. Berkeley \'lho served on a jury in a capital 
case. writing in the Los Angeles Times, Professor Robin Lakoff 
noted how misleading use of the word "shall" could be. She 
concluded, 
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"Therefore, to be sure of conveying the law correctly, 
the instructions should contain not only ~ but also 
an addendum along these lines: 'Whero the aggravation 
outweighs mitigation, you are permitted to impose tho 
death penalty-but you ~ ~ required ~ QQ ~.' The 
jury I served on received just such an instruction, and 
voted, with full understanding, for life without 
possibility of parole." 
Lakoff, "Life or Death Confusion in the Law," Los Angeles Times, 
Part II, p.S, Jan. 3, 1986. 
since Brown, the Supreme Court has reviewed two cases to 
determine whether instructions pursuant to the Briggs Initiative 
misled the sentencer as to the discretion to be exercised. In 
both cases, a death penalty verdict was reversed. In People v. 
Davenport (1985) 41 C.3d 247, the jury was given an instruction 
that closely tracked the language of Section 190.3, that a 
sentence of death shall be imposed if the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The Court 
found the error was compounded by two other instructional errors. 
The jury was not told that other crimes must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Robertson (1982) 33 
C.3d 21. And in delineating potential aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, the Court used the language of section 190.3 (k), 
that they could consider "any other circumstances which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal 
excuse for the crime." The Court had previously noted the 
potential for confusion of factor (k) in People v. Easley (1983) 
34 C.3d 858, since it could be construed to exclude circumstances 
that relate to the general character, family background or other 
aspects of the defendant unrelated to the crime. since the only 
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mitigation Gvidenca offord by tho defendant ralatedto the 
circumstances of his upbringing, the. Court found tho 
instructional errors were prejudicial. 
In Eeople v. Walker (1985) 41 C.3d 116, the instruction that 
the jurors ahall impose a penalty of death if aggravating 
circumstances oub/e1gh mitigating circumstances was again 
compounded by the factor (k) instruction. These errors were 
fully exploited in the prosecutor's closing argument, leading the 
Court to conclude that sufficient prejudice was shown to warrant 
reversal. 
The final reversal of a death penalty determination pursuant 
to the 1978 Briggs Initiative was based on 'denial of effective 
counsel at the penalty phase. In People v. Deere (1985) 41 C.3d 
353, the defendant pled guilty to first degree murder charges and 
admitted the special circumstance of multiple murder. At the 
penalty phase, counsel cooperated with the defendant's wish that 
no mitigating evidence be pres·ented. The Court held that the 
state's interest in an accurate determination of penalty requires 
counsel to present mitigating evidence even 'over the objection of 
his.client. Deere was a plain and simple case of the defendant's 
. use of the death penalty to commit suicide. The Court concluded 
that while one might elect t'o sacrifice his life in atonement for 
a crime, he cannot compel the state to use their resources to 
take his life. The state has its own strong interest in reducing 
the risk of mistaken or inappropriate death judgments. 
To sum·up, three of the five reversals of penalty 
determinations pursuant to the 1978 Briggs Initiative were 
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because of instructional errors directly attributable to the 
drafting of section 190.3. It appears these provisions were 
deliberately inserted to increase the probability of death 
penalties being imposed beyond the 1977 death penalty law. That 
was a calculated risk with great potential to wreak havoc in the 
courts. While the Court has resolved most of the ambiguities 
that are likely to recur, that action does not undo the errors 
that had already been committed in many of the cases still 
pending before" the Supreme Court. 
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VI conclusions and Recommendati.ons. 
A review of the cases applying the 1977 death penalty law 
and the 1978 Briggs Initiative suggests fe"'l areas \'1here 
legislative action would be appropriate. Indeed, there is a 
grave risk that legislative "tinkering" could inject new 
uncertainties into the law just at the moment most of the old 
uncertainties have been removed. While an inordinately high 
number of cases had to be reversed, 65% of those reversals did 
not affect the validity of the underlying convictions, but 
related only to the finding of special circumstances or the 
determination of penalty. There is a sharp contrast between the 
cases in "lhich II special circumstances" were determined under the 
1977 law, 75% of which were affirmed, and cases in which "special 
circumstances" \flere determined under the 1978 Briggs Initiative, 
75% of which were reversed. There is yet to be full affirmance 
of a death penalty under the Briggs Initiative. Most of the 
reversals of cases tried under the Briggs Initiative are directly 
attributable to the drafting of the Initiative. contradictions, 
ambiguities, ignorance of precedent, inconsistencies and 
erroneous citations all abound. The harvest of reversals we are 
reaping ",as sown in November of 1978. Sadly, it was all 
predictable even then. Many of the predictions came from 
prominent legislators and prosecutors: 
Sen. Orner Rains: "Sen. Rains doubts Proposition 7 is 
constitutional, because it wasn't drafted as 
carefully as the present death penalty law, 
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Lowell Jensen, then 
District Attorney, 
Alameda county; 
taking into account all the various, and 
varying, court rulings on capital 
punishment." (Ventura Co. star Free Press, 
Oct. 1, 1978). 
now Deputy Attorney . 
General of the U.S.:"Prop~ 7 ~lOuld be difficult to defend from 
constitutional attacks. I think the present 
law is about as far as you can go in line 
with supreme Court decisions." (Oakland 
Tribtine, October 24, 1978). 
Joseph Freitas, then 
District Attorney, 
San Francisco: "proposition 7 provides for certain 
'mandatory' executions and will put a very 
difficult, if not impossible burden upon 
juries to determine if 'aggravating 
circumstances outtoleigh mitigating 
circumstances' affecting the numerous 
possible conditions that could determine the 
choice of penalty in a given case." (.L.A. 
Daily Journal, Nov. 2, 1978). 
William o'Malley, then 
District Attorney, 
Contra costa county:"Prop. 7 is too broad to stand a court test. 
It tries to cover all the bases and that's 
where the trouble is." (Oakland Tribune, 
Oct. 28, 1978). 
Many leading newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, Oakland 
Tribune and San Francisco Chronicle, urged defeat of the Briggs 
Initiative because of doubts concerning its constitutionality and 
its potential for confusion. 
Even a well-drafted law will be followed by a "shake-down" 
period in which a large back-log of appeals will accumulate and 
numerous reversals will be necessary. As the .1981 study of 
appellate reversals by the Judicial Council demonstrated, that 
was our experience with the new Determinate Sentencing Law 
enacted in 1977. When the law is not well-drafted, the problem 
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/ 
is only compoundod.' LowGr courts are left to gueso at how 
ambiguities will be' resolved until authoritativQ' appellate 
rulings are compiled. That process will always take several 
years. 
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Recommendations 
(A) Now that the "shake-down" period is ending, it would make 
sense to bring the language of the legislation into conformity 
with the judicial rulings of the past ten years. This can be 
accomplished by the following amendments to Penal Code section 
190.2, defining "special circumstances" warranting imposition of 
a penalty of death or life without parole: 
(1) Subsection (a) (14), relating to "especially heinouE, 
atrocious or cruel" murders should be repealed. The 
language was declared unconstitutionally vague, and 
Subsection (a) (18), relating to murders involving 
infliction of torture, is sUfficient to achieve the 
purpose. 
(2) Subsection (a) (17) (ii) should be amended to read 
"kidnapping in violation of Sections 207 or 209." 
(3) Subsection (a) (17) (viii) should be amended to read 
"Arson in ~iolation of section 451." 
(B) No rational reason appears for the distinction in section 
190.2 (a) (10) between witnesses in criminal proceedings and 
witnesses in juvenile proceedings. The section should be amended 
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to include witn0seoG in juvenile proceedings. 
(C) The preclusion of guilty pleas in capital cases without the 
consent of counsel in Penal Coda section 1018 is inconsistent 
with the right of self-representation. At the same time, the 
state interest in accurate and appropriate imposition of death 
penalties recognized in Peoplev. Deere requires participation by 
counsel in the penalty phase. section 1018 should be amended to 
allow a defendant who knowingly, intelligently and competently 
\ilaives counsel to enter a guilty plea at the guilt phase, but to 
require the participation of counsel at the penalty phase. 
(D) The legislature should address the underlying problem of 
sloppily drafted initiatives. While most of the flaws in the 
drafting o~ the Briggs Initiative were apparent before it was 
enacted, the initiative process left no room for the pruning and 
refining which is part of the ordinary legislative process. The 
late Professor Donald Hagman of U.C.L.A. facetiously suggested 
one remedy: make "drunken drafting" a criminal offense. A more 
realistic approach might be to establish differing threshholds in 
terms of the number of signatures required to qualify an 
initiative, with a lower number available if the initiative is 
submitted for public hearings and redrafting before it is placed 
on the ballot. 
(E) .The high number of reversals for. incompetency of defense 
counsel, .combined with the fact that nearly all capital cases are 
handled by appointed counool, suggosts the urgency ot tunding the 
compensation for counsel in capital cases at sUfficient levels to 
attract the most qualified and competent lawyers available. 
! 
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APPENDIX 
A. AUTOMATIC AppEALS UNDER 1977 DEATH PENALTY LAW 
Conviction 
Of Guilt 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
REVERSED 7-0 
(D was deprived 
of adequate and 
eftective repreaen-
tation ot counsel}. 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
AFFIRMED 5-2 ' 
finding Q( 
Spgcial Circumstance. 
REVERSED 6-1 
1. robbery-murder 
(crime Wall committed prior to the 
the 1977 death penalty legislation) 
1. robbery-murder 
2. kidnap murder 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
1. robbery-murder 
,2. prior murder 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
1. robbery-murder 
2. prior murders 
REVERSED .(-3 
1. robbery-murder 
2. kidnap-murder 
(robbery-murder special 
circumstance reversed 
because the robbery was 
incidental to the murder; kidnap-
murder special circumstance 
reversed because of improper 
argument to the jury by the 
prosecutor) . 
. REVERSED 7-0 
1. robbery-murder 
'2. burglary-murder 
(the burglary and robbery were 
incidental to the murder) 
AFFIRMED 4-3 
L burglary-murder 
2. multiple-murder 
D9termination 
or Penalty 
REVERSED 4-3 
(Witherspoon error) 
REVERSED 6-1 
(Witherspoon error) 
AFFIRMED 4-3 
1. no error in denying 
motion for appointment 
of additional counsel to argue 
the penalty phaae. 
2. No inadequacy of trial counsel 
at the guilt phat!e 
3. 1977 death penalty law is 
constitutional. 
8 f!!:211I!ll v, Qb~~sl REVERSED 4-2 1. raPtl-murdor 
28 Cnl.3d 739, 170 (trinl court GrNd 2. robb<try-murd,u' 
Cal. Rptr. 71)8 (1931) in eccCiptina D'a ~. multlple-murdor 
ltUilty pl~a without 
i coneent of couno<ill) ~ I 
\) PWQIf! v. Ha!Ii@ AFFIRMED 4-2 AFFIRMED 4-2 AFFIRMED 4-2 
28 Ca1.3d 1)35, 171 1. robbary-murdu 1. prf!trial publicity did not 
Cal. Rptr. 671) (19111) 2. bure:lary-murdllr deny ri,ht to a fair 
Ilnd impartial jury. 
2. f!rror, if any, in prosecutor's 
elicitini admillion 
that D had been convicted of 
a prior felony was cured by 
instruction. 
10 Peoj2le v. Murtishaw AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 6-1 
29 Cal.3d 733, 175 1. multiple-murder (trial court erred in admitting 
Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) psychiatric testimony predicting 
future violence). 
11 People v. Ha3kett AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 6-1 
30 Cal.3d 841, 180 1. multiple-murder (Commutation instruction violated 
Cnl. Rptr. 640 (1982) MOMle) 
12 PeoQle v. HOKan REVERSED 4-2 1. multiple murder 
31 Cal.3d 815, Hl3 (involuntary statements 
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982) from D were admitted). 
13 PeoQle v. Stankewih. REVERSED 4-2 1. kidnap-murder 
32 Cal.3d 80, 184 (trial court failed to 2. robbery-murder 
Cal. Rptr. 611 (1982) conduct a competency 
hearing}. 
14 PeoQle v. Arcegn REVERSED 5-2 1. multiple-murder .. 
32 Cal.3d 504, 186 (error to admit 
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982) psychiatric testimony 
based on statements made 
during examination of Dto 
determine competency). 
15 P"oQle v. Gzikowski REVERSED 5-2 1. multiple-murder 
32 Cal.3d 580, 186 {Deprivation of D's right 
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982) to defend with counsel of 
his choice deprived him of' 
due process}. 
16 PeoQle v. Robertson AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 4-3 
33 Cal.3d 21,188 1. multiple-murder {prejudicial error at the penalty 
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982) 2. torture-murder phase in failing to instruct the 
3. robbery-murder jury that evidence of other crimes 
4. kidnap-murder could not be considered as factors 
5. rape-murder in aggravation unless they were 
bt' proved beyond a reasonable dou J. 
17 PeoRle v. EMley AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 
34 Cal.3d 858, 196 1. murder for consideration 6-1 (Trial court erred in 
Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983) 2. multiple-murder informing the jury that it must 
not be influenced by pity or 
sympathy for D). 
17 &.J pi, I, EM1U 
(continued) 
18 D_ 
.L..e()DI, y. Mroc.k2 
311 Cal.3d 86 (1983) 
19 .& topl. Y. Fjeld! 
~II Cal.3d 320, 197 
aI. Rptr. 803 (1983) 
20 P ~Ie v. Harris 
~6 Cal.3d 36, 201 
11.1. Rptr. 782 (1984) 
21 ~I e v. Lanphear 
~6 CaI.3d 163, 203 
al. Rptr. 122 (1984) 
(Retrial of case #4) 
22 Peonl_ ~ev.Mathon 
37 Cal.3d 85 (1984) 
23~ 
e v. Memro 
38 C I a .3d 658 214 
C I ' II. Rptr. 832 (1985) 
24 P ~ev. Frank 
38 Cal.3d 711 214 
C I ' 
II. • Rptr. 801 (1985) 
2S Pe I ~ v. Frierson 
39 Cal.3d 803 218 
C I ' 
(
a. Rptt. 73 (1985) 
Ret· Mal of Case #2) 
26 P ~ple v ("'C~-.. .~
-II C I a .3d 1 (1985) 
27 P ~ v. Phillips 
'HC I a .3d 29 (1985) 
REVERSED 7-0 
(D wu denied etrectin 
u.i.tance of coun.el by connict). 
AFFIRMED 4-2 
REVERSED 4-2 
(violation of D's right 
to a jury drawn from 
a representative cross-
section of the community). 
[PREVIOUSLY AFFIRMED] 
REVERSED 4-2 
(police elicited confessions 
after D had invoked his 
privilege against self 
incrimination) . 
REVERSED 4-3 
(trial court erred in 
denying D's discovery motion). 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
1. prior conviction of 
cecond dei1'e. murdar 
AFFIRMED 4-2 
1. robbery-murder 
1. robbery-murder 
2. burglary-murder 
3. multiple-murder 
[PREVIOUSLY AFFIRMED] 
1. rape-murder 
2. kidnap-murder 
3. lewd acts with a child 
under 14 
4. multiple murder 
1. multiple murder 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
1. murder-kidnapping 
REVERSED 4-2 
(Defense counsel could not refuse 
5-2'(tri&1 court emad in in.tructin, 
tho jury under the 1978 death 
p.nalty law, rllther thlln the 1077 I ) aw. 
AFFIRMED 4-2 
(D.murdered th. victim willfully, 
dehberately, with premeditation 
and during the commision of a rob~fY 
and was sane when he committed the 
act). 
REVERSED 5-1 
(trial court erred in instructing 
the jury not to 
base their verdict on sympathy 
for D). 
REVERSED 4-2 
(trial court erred in admitting 
evidence obtained by overbroad 
search warrant). 
to honor D's expressed desire to 
present diminished capacity defense 
at special circumstances phase of trial) 
REVERSED 5-2 
(Beeman error) 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
1. robbery-murder 
2. murdering of police officer 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
1. robbery-murder 
REVERSED 4-2 
1. improper introduction of D's 
prior criminal conduct. 
2. failure to give a reasonable 
doubt instruction regard' th . lOgo er crime 
r 
I 
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B. AUTOMATIC APPEAl.S UNDER 1016 BRIGgS INITIATIVE 
people v. Rnmos 
30 CrJ.!.3d 563, 180 
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982) 
CoDviljti9D 
QLQyill 
AFFIRMED 7-0 
On Remand, 31 CaUd 136; 
201 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984). 
2 PeoEle v. Mozingo 
34 Cal.3d 926, 196 
Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983) 
3 Peol:!le v. Josel:!h 
34 Cal.3d 938, 196 
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983) 
4 Peol:!le v. Alcala 
36 Cal.3d 604, 206 
Cal. Rptr. 715 (1984) 
5 People v. Whitt 
36 Cal.3d 124, 205 
Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984) 
6 People v. Turner 
37 Cal.3d 302, 208 
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984) 
7 People v. McDonald 
37 CaUd 351, 208 
Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) 
REVERSED 7-0 
(inadequate represen-
tation of counsel) 
REVERSED 1-0 
(Faretta Error) 
REVERSED 5-1 
(Admission of D's prior 
offenseG WM prejudicild) 
AFFIRMED 1-0 
AFFIRMED 6-0 
REVERSED 6-0 
Conviction was decreased 
to second degree murder. 
1. Trial Court erred in 
excluding expert testimony. 
2. Jury's failure to specify 
the degree of murder in its 
verdict rendered the conviction 
!econd degree murder as a 
matter of law. 
£irujIDIj: of 
~9Sil\l Clrtum,\pnce, 
REVERSED 7-0 
1. robbery-murder 
1. rnpe-murd<!ll' 
2. especially heinous, atrocious 
nnd cruel. 
1. robbery-murder 
1. kidnap murder 
REVERSED 6-1 
1. robbery-murder 
(Carlos/Garcia error) 
REVERSED 6-0 
1. burglary-murder 
2. multiple murder 
(Carlos/Garcia error and 
the multiple murder special 
circumstances could not stand 
because based on invalid felony-
murder special circumstances.) 
1. robbery-murder 
Dd.rmjo!ti2o 
Of PeDl\Ur 
[REVERSED 6-1 
(Brii'" instruction violated 
due procus)) 
8 Pf9pl. I, Holt REVERSED 5-1 1. robb.ry-murder 
37 Cal.3d 4~, 20a 1. Trial court erred in 
Cal. Rptr. 1547 (10tl4) admittlnc: the t •• timony 
of D', ac:compllcl; 
2. Trial court .rred in 
admittin" 0'. prior 
burilary conviction •. 
3. Trial court erred in 
permittin& a defen.e 
witn ... to b. impeached 
with prior conviction •. 
9 P~Qle v. Armendarir; AFFIRMED 1-0 REVERSED 1-0 
37 Cal.3d 573, 209 1. burilary-murder 
Cal. Rptr. 66 .. (198 .. ) 2. robbery-murder 
(Carlol-Garcia error) 
10 P~Qle v. Bigelow REVERSED 7-0 REVERSED 7-0 
37 Cal.3d 731, 209 1. Trial Court failed to 1. kidnap-murder 
CZll. Rptr. 328 (198 .. ) appoint advisory coun.el 2. robbery-murder 
2. evidence of prior crimes 3. murder for financial gain 
was inadmissable. ... murder-perfecting escape 
11 PeoEle v. Anderson AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 7-0 
38 Cal.3d 58, 210 1. burglary-murder 
Cal. Rptr. 777 (1985) {Carlos/Garcia error} 
12 PeoQle v. Bo:td AFFIRMED 6-0 REVERSED 6-0 
38 Cal.3d 162, 215 1. robbery-murder 
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985) (Carlos/Garcia error) 
13 PeoQle v. Ha:tes AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 7-0 
38 Cal.3d 180, 21 .. 1. multiple-murder 
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985) 2. robbery murder 
(Carlos/Garcia error) 
14 PeoEle v. Chaver; AFFIRMED 6-1 REVERSED 1-0 
39 CaUd 823, 218 1. robbery-murder 
Cal. Rptr ... 9 (1985) (Carlos/Garcia error) 
15 PeoEle v. Montiel AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 1-0 
39 Cal.3d 910, 218 1. murder for financial gain (Briggs Instruction and 
Cal. Rptr. 572 (1985) 2. murder was especially heinous, instruction jury not to be 
attrocious, and cruel swayed by mere sentiment or 
3. robbery-murder sympathy both required reversal). 
(Carlos/Garcia error) 
16 Peo[!le v. Guerra AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 6-1 
40 Cal.3d 377 (1985) 1. robbery-murder 
2. kidnapping-murder 
{Carlos/Garcia error} 
17 PeoEle v. Brown AFFIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 1-0 REVERSED 5-2 
40 Cal.3d 512 (1985) 1. murder during rape (Error to instruct 
that the jury not to be 
swayed by mere sentiment or 
sympathy). 
18 ~In v. Fl,\!mh'l~ AFVIR.."IED 1-0 REVEruJED 5-2 
40 C~.3d 629 (106~) I. robb:Jry-murdu 
(CarIOil/Garcia error) 
19 e~2X11!U I, M~~21!l REVERSED ~-2 1. robbGry-murder 
-w Cnl.3d 620 (1035) (D pled llUilty to a 2. prior murder conviction 
cr.pital Orr'IInSG without 
the conuent of counlllll). 
20 ~eoQl0 v. Hamilton AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 5-2 
(Barnftrd Lee) 1. robbery-murder 
41 Ca1.3d 408 (1985) 2. burttlary-murder 
S. kidnapping-murder 
(Carlol/Garcift error) 
21 ~le v. Silberton AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 5-2 
41 Cn1.3d 296 (1985) 1. robbery-murder 
(Carlol/Garcia error) 
22 Peo2le v. BalderatJ AFFIRMED 6-1 REVERSED 5-2 
41 CaUd 144 (1985) 1. robbery-murder 
(Carloll/Garcia error) 
23 Peo2le v. Hamilton AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 4-3 
(Bill Ray) 1. robbery-murder 
41 Cal.3d 211 (1985) 2. 2 multiple murder findings. 
(Carloa/Garcia error) 
21 Peol2ie v. Davenl20rt AFFIRMED 6-0 AFFIRMED 6-0 REVERSED 5-1 
41 Ca1.3d 247 (1985) 1. torture-murder (jury instructions on 
mitigating evidence were 
erroneous). 
25 Peo2le v. Walker AFFIRMED 6-0 AFFIRMED 6-0 REVERSED 4-2 
41 Ca1.3d 116 (1985) 1. robbery-murder (jury instructions on 
mitigating evidence were 
erroneous). 
26 Pe02le v. Leach AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 5-2 
41 Ca1.3d 92 (1985) 1. torture murder 
2. robbery murder 
(Carlos/Garcia error) 
27 Peo2le v. Deere AF'FIRMED 7-0 AFFIRMED 7-0 REVERSED 6-1 
41 Ca1.3d 353 (1985) 1. multiple-murder (trial counsel was 
incompetent in failing to 
offer mitigating evidence at 
the penalty phase). 
